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With the advances of analytical sensitivity,
it is now possible to detect a DNA pro-
file fromminute quantity of DNA. It opens
new investigative avenues (in cold cases for
example), but also new interpretative chal-
lenges. Here, forensic scientists deal with
items bearing DNA cellular material from
areas showing no visible stain and have
limited means to identify the nature of
the body fluid involved. Such DNA cells
can be considered as trace evidence that
can be exchanged for reasons connected to
the alleged facts under investigation (gen-
erally a direct transfer) but also follow-
ing alternative and versatile ways (through
secondary or tertiary transfer) that have
no connection to the facts under investi-
gation. The trace becomes an ubiquitous
material that can be found for uncon-
nected reasons. In addition, and especially
with trace quantities of DNA, the debate
in court is less focused on the issue of
the source of the DNA (often the parties
will not dispute it), but on the mecha-
nisms whereby the biological material has
been transferred (Taroni et al., 2013). In
other words, the well-known territory of
source level DNA statistics (see Buckleton
et al., 2005 for example) does not help with
the interpretation process, but the foren-
sic scientist is invited to assess how likely it
would be to observe this amount of DNA
given various transfer mechanisms. The
review by Meakin and Jamieson (2013) led
them to conclude that the quantity of DNA
or the quality of the profile cannot be used
“to reliably infer the mode of transfer by
which the DNA came to be on the surface
of interest.”
This rather complicated new landscape
leads to two questions:
(1) Is it the role of the scientist to offer
guidance as to the probability of the
DNA findings given various transfer
mechanisms put forward by the par-
ties depending on the case circum-
stances?
(2) Can a forensic scientist robustly assess
the probability of the DNA findings
given alleged transfer scenarios in the
current state of knowledge?
Regarding the first, my view is that it is
definitely the role of the forensic scientist
to provide as much guidance to the trier of
facts if the knowledge he/she may bring is
outside the general knowledge of the court
and relevant to the task at hand. Shying
away from this duty on the ground that
considerations regarding transfer of trace
DNA is less known than source level DNA
statistics is not acceptable. There is a risk
with leaving the presence of DNA to be
assessed by others, left to advocacy, when
the scientist can bring decisive knowledge
(let alone the papers reviewed by Meakin
and Jamieson), including highlighting
how complex the task may be. We want to
avoid the simplistic line of argument that I
have heard at times: “We have found DNA
corresponding to the defendant on the
trigger of firearm, hence he manipulated
the gun.” It is crucial for a fair adminis-
tration of justice that forensic scientists
weigh their expectations of the amount of
DNA recovered given both views. Hence
scientists’ guidance is required when the
consideration of transfer mechanisms,
persistence and background levels of the
material has a significant impact on the
understanding of the alleged activities
and requires expert knowledge. But to
provide guidance, the scientist will need
information regarding the alleged case cir-
cumstances from both prosecution and
defense’s perspective. The duty may also
require the scientist to highlight how little
is known on transfer mechanisms and urge
for a very careful assessment of the eviden-
tial contribution of the forensic findings,
regardless of their strength with regards to
the issue of the source itself. The absence
of knowledge should not be an excuse for a
guilty silence and for delegating the task to
the fact finder without making explicit
the complexity surrounding such an
assessment.
In relation to the second question,
Risinger (2013) warns against the “abuse
of the notion of subjective probability,”
. . . “by simply making their best guess
from experience when more should be
required.” In contrast, courts (I will
concentrate here on the jurisdiction of
England and Wales) have recently given
a lot of freedom or authority to DNA
scientists to exercise their professional
judgement even when limited or no pub-
lished data were available. In R v Reed
and Reed (2009), the court ruled that
in the context of the analysis of minute
quantity of DNA, a reporting scientist
is fully entitled to assess and weigh the
relative merits of the possible mecha-
nisms whereby cellular material can be
exchanged. In that case the forensic sci-
entist testified that, in her experience, it
was highly unlikely that the appellants
had innocently touched the knives and
it was unrealistic that each appellant had
passed their DNA to someone else who
then transferred it to the pieces of plastic
which were found at the victim’s address.
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The court while recognizing that the sci-
entific knowledge on transferability was
incomplete, ruled that enough reliability
had been demonstrated when the scien-
tist is asked to consider cases where more
than 200 picograms of DNA had been
recovered. The court however stressed that
“care must be taken to guard against the
dangers of that evaluation being tainted
with the verisimilitude of scientific cer-
tainty.” The scientist is then authorized to
comment on the probability of the forensic
results given various transfer mechanisms
as long as he/she makes it clear that we
are dealing here with large uncertainty.
This judgement led to a few commentaries.
Jamieson (2011) highlighted the limited
body of evidence represented by the few
papers quoted by the court to support
their opinion and warned against the view
that the personal experience might over-
ride scientific research. A worry echoed in
an editorial (Nic Daéid, 2010) in Science
and Justice following the next case against
Weller.
In R v Weller (2010), (a case involv-
ing the transfer of a reasonable quan-
tity of DNA under the fingernails of the
defendant), the defense appealed on the
ground that knowledge regarding trans-
fer and persistence mechanisms of DNA
was not sufficient for experts to have been
able to express an evaluation of the rel-
ative merit of the alleged activities. The
Court of Appeal confirmed the positions
taken in Reed and Reed. Given the diffi-
culties of conducting systematically exper-
iments replicating the circumstances in a
particular case, the court recognized that a
scientist is fully entitled to express a pro-
fessional opinion on his/her expectation
of DNA quantities given each mechanism
envisaged by the court if the scientist has
sufficient casework day-to-day experience.
Jamieson and Meakin (2010) expressed
their concerns after Weller seeing courts
in England and Wales putting more trust
in claimed experience than in published,
peer-reviewed, publications. Rudin and
Inman (2010a) also insisted on the fact
that bald experience is not an acceptable
substitute for experimental data.
Following these two cases, the Court
of Appeal confirmed that view in sub-
sequent rulings, not only in relation to
consideration of DNA transfer but also
of the sources of complex DNA mixtures.
In R v Thomas (2011), a DNA scientist
invoked her 12 year experience (and some
unpublished and undisclosed data) to
suggest that in a three-person DNA mix-
ture, there was a low expectation of find-
ing components matching all those of the
appellant adventitiously. In R v Dlugosz
et al. (2013), the court, recognizing their
extensive professional experience, allowed
two DNA scientists to qualify the occur-
rence of alleles in a complex mixture cor-
responding to the defendant as a “rare”
for one and “somewhat unusual” for the
other. The qualitative opinion expressed
by the scientists was offered as an accept-
able substitute in cases where the mixture
is too complex for a quantitative assess-
ment. However, as pointed out by Evett
and Pope (2013), “there is no scientific
basis for this belief—no scientific literature
provides a reliable methodology, scientists
are not trained to make such assessments
and there is no body of standards to sup-
port them. Casework experience is not a
substitute.” One needs to assess the robust-
ness of such qualitative opinion through
a structured program of proficiency tests:
it should not be based on casework data,
but onDNAmixtures obtained under con-
trolled conditions. Expressing qualitative
judgments on the basis (or assumptions)
of casework samples, without any cali-
bration mechanism, is dangerous in my
view. The expressed opinion could be the
expression of nothing more than the ipse
dixit of the expert.
The Court of Appeal endorsed such
a laissez faire approach drawing from
a much larger jurisprudence applicable
to expertise in general, with some deci-
sions relating to other areas of forensic
disciplines. For example, in R v Otway
(2011), involving gait analysis, and two
other cases, namely R v Atkins and
Atkins (2009), (face recognition) and
R v T (2010), (footwear mark), the court
recognized that an expert may express a
qualitative opinion in the absence of quan-
titative (or statistical) supporting data as
long as the subjective nature of the opin-
ion and its foundation are transparently
presented without giving more scientific
weight to the judgment than it disserves.
Edmond et al. (2010) remains rightly skep-
tical with the approach of dressing an
opinion with all the concessions of lim-
itations, but still allowing it, when the
real significance of the forensic findings
remains simply unknown.
In my view, what is critical, when
it comes to offer expert opinions (in
the present discussion regarding DNA
transfer), is striking the appropriate bal-
ance between structured documented data
(published or not) and unfettered personal
opinion. Should these opinions be based in
extenso on experience?My answer is clearly
negative. I believe that experience consti-
tutes a poor substitute to a systematic and
structured acquisition of data. Any scien-
tist offering views as to his/her expecta-
tions for the forensic findings under given
case-related circumstances should be able
to put forward documented sets of con-
trolled experiments whose relevancy to
the case under dispute can be argued. A
further question is how many controlled
experiments should be conducted and how
close should they be to the alleged circum-
stances. In my view that question should
be approached on a case-by-case basis
using the adversarial mechanisms available
to the parties. The major improvement
here is that all parties can access and chal-
lenge the body of knowledge available to
the expert proffering an opinion. As Rudin
and Inman (2010a) indicated, the prob-
lem with experience only based opinions
is that it cannot be challenged beyond the
sterile opposition between mere opinions.
Requiring the disclosure of structured data
opens the route to a new type of debate
regarding the relative merits of the assess-
ments provided.
We could legitimately ask, as did Rudin
and Inman (2010b), whether or not foren-
sic science has gone too far in terms of sen-
sitivity, meaning that the risks associated
with the analysis of irrelevant (meaning
not associated with the criminal activities
under investigation) items are too high.
I believe that the problem lies more in the
usage made by law enforcement authori-
ties of such sensitive technologies. There
are only gains in terms of investigative
leads if we take advantage of sensitive tech-
niques, but maybe these methods should
be used only in the investigative phase,
not as a basis for evidence relied on at
trial. Highly sensitive DNA analysis offers
extraordinary ways to enhance an investi-
gation through the suggestion of potential
named sources (through DNA databases)
for the inquiry to consider. I am not calling
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for limiting such opportunities. However,
moving from such investigative informa-
tion toward elements of evidentiary pur-
poses to be used in court requires very
careful attention. It may well be the case
that a decisive investigative information
will not be brought to court because of
the issues discussed above. This is not a
failure of forensic science, but simply an
appropriate and fair (re-)positioning of
the scientific techniques within the crim-
inal justice process.
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